Linux · Kernel · Linux Kernel Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Vulnerability
Verdict
Patch soon · actively exploited, reachable from the internet without credentials, and in the top 25% of CVEs by near-term exploitation probability
Added to CISA KEV 2026-09-18 · exploited in the wild for 9 days
CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL. The score is a summary; these three components are the part that decides whether something scanning the internet can use it.
| Attack vector | networkreachable over the network, with no local access needed |
|---|---|
| Privileges required | noneneeds no credentials at all |
| User interaction | nonecan be triggered with nobody interacting with the page or request |
| Base vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Weakness | CWE-754 |
This describes the vulnerability. It says nothing about whether your systems run it.
EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.0288, which places it in the top 25% of all tracked CVEs. The percentile is the more useful half: 0.18 in absolute terms sounds low until you know most of the internet-facing software in the world scores under that.
| EPSS probability | 0.0288 |
|---|---|
| Percentile | 0.863 — top 25% |
| Added to KEV | 2026-09-18 |
|---|---|
| Days exploited | 9 |
| Federal remediation due | not set |
| Ransomware use | no known ransomware campaign use |
Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.