CrushFTP · CrushFTP · CrushFTP Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
Verdict
Patch first · actively exploited, reachable from the internet without credentials, and in the top 1% of CVEs by near-term exploitation probability
Added to CISA KEV 2025-04-07 · exploited in the wild for 539 days · used in ransomware campaigns
CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL. The score is a summary; these three components are the part that decides whether something scanning the internet can use it.
| Attack vector | networkreachable over the network, with no local access needed |
|---|---|
| Privileges required | noneneeds no credentials at all |
| User interaction | nonecan be triggered with nobody interacting with the page or request |
| Base vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Weakness | CWE-305 |
This describes the vulnerability. It says nothing about whether your systems run it.
EPSS puts the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.9998, which places it in the top 1% of all tracked CVEs. The percentile is the more useful half: 0.18 in absolute terms sounds low until you know most of the internet-facing software in the world scores under that.
| EPSS probability | 0.9998 |
|---|---|
| Percentile | 1.000 — top 1% |
| Added to KEV | 2025-04-07 |
|---|---|
| Days exploited | 539 |
| Federal remediation due | not set |
| Ransomware use | known to be used in ransomware campaigns |
Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
CrushFTP 10 before 10.8.4 and 11 before 11.3.1 allows authentication bypass and takeover of the crushadmin account (unless a DMZ proxy instance is used), as exploited in the wild in March and April 2025, aka "Unauthenticated HTTP(S) port access." A race condition exists in the AWS4-HMAC (compatible with S3) authorization method of the HTTP component of the FTP server. The server first verifies the existence of the user by performing a call to login_user_pass() with no password requirement. This will authenticate the session through the HMAC verification process and up until the server checks for user verification once more. The vulnerability can be further stabilized, eliminating the need for successfully triggering a race condition, by sending a mangled AWS4-HMAC header. By providing only the username and a following slash (/), the server will successfully find a username, which triggers the successful anypass authentication process, but the server will fail to find the expected SignedHeaders entry, resulting in an index-out-of-bounds error that stops the code from reaching the session cleanup. Together, these issues make it trivial to authenticate as any known or guessable user (e.g., crushadmin), and can lead to a full compromise of the system by obtaining an administrative account.
Web application penetration testing · API security testing · every service